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INDIGENOUS AS ‘NOT-INDIGENOUS’ AS ‘US’?: A 
DISSIDENT INSIDER’S VIEWS ON PUSHING THE BOUNDS 
FOR WHAT CONSTITUTES ‘OUR MOB’  
 
Gordon Chalmers* 
 
All of these labels just depended on how the official saw you... [i]t didn’t make any 
difference to us Yanyuwa mob what the whites, the welfare and the police reckoned and 
wrote down in the long, ruled books. We lived with our mothers and relations the way all 
our generations had for thousands of years – hundreds of generations. I didn’t know any 
[‘]half-caste[’] kids when I was living with my mother and our people. We were all 
Yanyuwa.   
Hilda Jarman Muir1 
 
I Introduction 
 
In Australia, ‘Aboriginality’ is often defined by people in constrictive ways that 
are heavily influenced by the coloniser’s epistemological frameworks. An essential 
component of this is a ‘racial’ categorisation of peoples that marks sameness and 
difference, thereby influencing insider and outsider status. In one sense, this 
categorisation of people acts to exclude non-aboriginal ‘others’ from participation in pre-
invasion indigenous ontologies; ways of living that may not have contained such 
restrictive identity categories and were thereby highly inclusive of outsiders. One of the 
effects of this is that aboriginal peoples’ efforts for ‘advancement’ – either out of 
‘disadvantage’ and/or towards political independence (ie. sovereignty) – become 
confined and restricted by what is deemed possible within the coloniser’s epistemological 
frameworks. This is so much so that aboriginal people are at risk of only reinforcing and 
upholding the very systems that resulted in their original and continuing dispossession. 
 
                                                      
*  Gordon Chalmers is a Yanyuwa lecturer in the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Studies Unit at 
the University of Queensland, where he is currently undertaking a PhD in Philosophy. This work is 
concerned  with  exploring  Yanyuwa‐influenced  decolonial  analyses  of  Australian  law  and  it's 
relation to Australian aboriginal laws. 
In this paper I will draw upon my experiences and knowledge of the Yanyuwa aboriginal 
people’s laws and history in an effort to problematise the criteria for ‘aboriginality’ in 
australia. I will focus particularly on the legal definition of Aboriginality and reveal its 
inherent colonial racial criteria and purpose. I will contrast this with Yanyuwa 
conceptions of ‘aboriginality’ which will reveal their non-racially exclusive nature. In 
doing so, I seek to contest both the Australian legal construction of Aboriginality as well 
as the effects that it has on First Nations peoples’ construction of  their own (legal?) 
identities.   
 
 
II A note on language use 
 
Before I position myself in relation to what follows I would like to say a few things about 
my use of language in this paper. I wish to problematise the use of the english language 
in the australian context and point to its reinforcement of colonial power structures. In 
order to do this, certain proper nouns will be given a lower case letter instead of the usual 
uppercase first letter. And as I write this, I am already faced with the resistance to my 
approach as Microsoft Word reinforces the australian hegemony by supposedly 
correcting my apparent misuse of lower case letters.   
 
My intention is to use lower case letters for proper nouns and initially make a play on the 
use of the word ‘proper’. In un-capitalising the proper nouns I will be suggesting that 
there was nothing ‘proper’ about how these names came to predominate in this land 
called Australia (sic); nothing proper about how these names were super-imposed on a 
landscape that was already named;  nothing proper about how people who claimed to be 
the epitome of civilised beings conducted themselves in a most uncivilised manner when 
they came to this land mass; nothing proper abouthow these people failed to act in 
accordance with being a ‘proper’ (civilised) guest; nothing proper abouthow they didn’t 
‘wipe their shoes’ when they came into the new host’s domain and brought all manner of 
diseases that decimated aboriginal populations; and nothing proper abouthow these 
people usurped the hosts’ position and supplanted themselves as the new and supposedly 
more legitimate hosts. Their legitimacy is therefore under question.  
 
Furthermore, in using ‘capitalise’ as an intransitive verb where it means to ‘profit by’ or 
‘take advantage of’, the de-capitalising also functions as a device to counter the ‘profit’-
making at the expense of aboriginal peoples’ interests (ie land, family, ways of being in 
the world). Additionally, using ‘capital’ in its adjectival form where it means ‘principal’ 
(‘constituting or belonging to the highest category’), the de-capitalising functions as a 
decolonising gesture that seeks to at least question the position of white power and 
privilege as being the centre from which all things (negatively) ‘differ’.2 And lastly, using 
capital as a noun, where it means ‘material wealth’ (being equated with global capitalism 
that is preoccupied with the self-interested and exploitative accumulation of material 
wealth) the de-capitalising again functions as a decolonising endeavour that aims at 
bringing non-capitalist indigenous interests to the fore.  
This decolonial “decolonial turn”3 away from and against the trajectory of coloniality4 is 
not enacted without contradictionThe reader will see a number of these in the paper. But 
such contradictions shouldn’t be taken as negating the decolonial movement or rendering 
it ineffective. Rather, these apparent contradictions provide insight into the great extent 
to which colonial frameworks have ingrained themselves into our lives. They provide 
insight into just how hard it is to enact decolonial resistance while one is so firmly rooted 
in colonial epistemologies. In the revealing of their presence, there then arises the 
possibility for the construction of a new language that strives to become more reflective 
of the reality in which it seeks to engage. 
One particular anomaly that the reader will notice throughout this paper is a seeming 
contradiction in both the use and contestation of the word “aboriginal”. This colonially 
imposed word may be said to have two different usages: a social and a legal usage. When 
people identify themselves with this word, they are oftentimes using it as a means to refer 
to their own First Nations group, and all that is associated with this group’s 
epistemologies, ontologies and ‘legal’ jurisdictional realities. However, when this same 
term is used in Australian law it is referring to something completely different, as 
highlighted below. I like to distinguish these two senses of the word by using the 
uncapitalised form, the adjectival form of the word, to allow for its ability to ‘point’ to 
the First Nation group, albeit in an imperfect way. The other form of the word is the 
capitalised proper noun form “Aboriginal”, which I associate with the colonial legal 
construct that will be the focus of this paper.  
  
III Positioning this paper 
 
Now back to my introduction. I was born in the southern part of the northern 
territory in Arrente country in a little place that, in very recent times, has been called alice 
springs. But despite being conceived and born in the desert I was sustained and grew into 
manhood mostly in the Larrakia country of the northern tropics in a place now known as 
darwin. My mother’s mother was stolen from her Yanyuwa country and family in the 
gulf of carpentaria, but against the overwhelming forces that sought to keep her 
disconnected from her family and country, myself and a number of others helped steal 
her back home at various times. I wear the external colour of privilege in my light skin, 
but I grew up a life relatively devoid of privilege. I eventually studied law at the 
university of queensland, but only after ‘studying’ law in Yanyuwa country. I never 
really practiced (australian) law, but I am continually bound by it being practiced upon 
and through me. I did practice Yanyuwa law and I struggle continually to have it bind 
me. So I am aboriginal … officially, but I am not aboriginal real-ly. I am Yanyuwa, most 
definitely and real-ly, but not officially. Race marks me and is sought (by others) to 
become me, but I’m in a continual struggle to resist its imposition and its insidious 
affects. 
 
IV ‘Race’ within australian law 
 
In australia, race is so entrenched into the legal and social system that one could 
almost be excused for failing to acknowledge that race has for many years been relegated 
to the annals of pseudo-scientific history along with phrenology, eugenics and humorism. 
Despite years of archaeological,5 anthropological,6 and now genetic research,7 which 
have shown us that race is not a biological nor physical reality (but more of a social and 
political fantasy), we still live our lives heavily influenced by its apparent reality.  
 
I want to be very careful here not to suggest that race is therefore without influence on 
the daily lives of people, in the ways that ‘different’ people regularly interact with each 
other. I am all too aware of white privilege and the power that it asserts over black 
bodies.8 My suggestion here is more of a recognition that racialised thinking is akin to a 
kind of mental illness, being a delusion upon which one acts. Although the objects of the 
delusion are in many senses not real, the manifestation of one’s interaction with them is 
completely real.The effects of acting in the world in accordance with a race delusion is 
the stuff of racial taunting, racial violence and the control of racial ‘others’. It is a very 
‘bad trip’. 
 
Australia’s founding legal document, the australian constitution, has race firmly 
entrenched within its text. Section 51(xxvi) of the constitution allows the federal 
parliament to make laws for ‘the people of any race for whom it is deemed necessary to 
make special laws’ (emphasis added).9 There is even a racial discrimination act 1975 
(cth) (‘rda’) that seeks to benevolently address something that technically cannot exist.10 
Is it any wonder that for aboriginal people whose ‘race’ continues to be the subject of 
legal definition, administration and control, thatthere is an overwhelming sense in which 
elements of racial thinking are a normalised part of identity formation?   
 
Aboriginality has gone through more than 67 different definitions11 since the colonisers 
arrived, but consistent throughout all of these definitions was the will to control these 
‘different’ people. Protectionist legislation like the aboriginals protection and restriction 
of the sale of opium act12 enabled the control of such things as where people lived, where 
they could travel, who they could marry and their utilisation in the labour force. One may 
well ask, do current definitions of aboriginality have similar elements of control? If so, 
how does this control operate and what are its effects?  
 
At the Federal level, there are approximately 65 different pieces of legislation in which 
the word ‘race’ is found. In approximately 20 of these laws, reference is made to the 
“Aboriginal race of Australia”. Whilst these 65 different pieces of legislation enable the 
protection and provision of beneficial measures to all races (whatever that may be), the 
“Aboriginal race of Australia” is the only named race in these laws. This legal category 
of Aboriginality has been further clarified by judicial pronouncement to be people who: 
1.  Are descended from the aboriginal peoples of australia, 
2. Self identify as an australian aboriginal, and 
3. Are accepted as an aboriginal by a community of aboriginal peoples.13  
 
At the heart of this definition of Aboriginality is the racially-aligned criterion of 
‘descent’. Descent is the feature that links aboriginality to the biological characteristic of 
genetic lineage. This aboriginality is therefore bound up with biological descent from the 
aboriginal people who lived on this continent pre-invasion. At first glance this appears 
self-evident, but I wish to problematise the em-bodied essentialisation of Aboriginality by 
later contrasting it with what I consider to be more important ontological considerations. 
However, before I do this, I want to follow on with considering how this legal identity 
construct functions to enable the colonial control of this constructed identity and the 
resultant effects of this control.   
 
 
V The relationship between race and special measures 
Presently, one of the major reasons for the existence of this legal identity category 
“Aboriginal” is for the provision of special measures in accordance with the international 
convention on the elimination of racial discrimination (‘icerd’)14 via the rda. These 
special measures allow for an effective positive discrimination on the basis of race so as 
to alleviate recognised disadvantage.15 Special measures often come in the form of 
additional resources like those provided under the federal government's ‘closing the gap’ 
measures. Ironically however, in order to address disadvantage, these measures reinforce 
the use of the same kind of racial categories that not only originally led to the 
disadvantage, but that social scientists and geneticists tell us are an outdated and 
inappropriate way of categorising people. 
 
If one looks at the ideas surrounding special measures one can see that ‘Aboriginality’ is 
being used as a means to assimilate that very difference into a non-Indigenous norm. 
How does this work? Special measures are only to be used up until they relieve the 
disadvantage that they were originally put in place to overcome.16 At this point, the 
special measures are deemed to have achieved their purpose and are no longer justified in 
continuing. One of the indicators of this is the achievement of standard indicators of 
wellbeing, defined in accordance with the measures of health and wellbeing of the 
dominant culture. What this means at present is that the category of ‘Aboriginal’ as a 
legal and administrative identity is used as a means of controlling the homogenisation of 
heterogeneous indigenous groups for the purpose of having them live lives in accordance 
with indicators of well-being that they have not had any part in creating; indicators of 
well-being that may be said to conflict with and exclude some aboriginal peoples’ 
indicators of well-being.17 Assimilation by stealth? 
 
One may then ask, what happens to the definition of aboriginality when this parity has 
been achieved? Would there still be a need to have the definition in place after the special 
measures are no longer in place? One could say that the definition still functions as a 
means by which parliament can use the race power of the australian constitution18 to 
assert a level of non-beneficial, or paternalistic ‘beneficial’, control over aboriginal 
people, as was exercised in the hindmarsh island bridge matter19 and the northern 
territory intervention.20 
 
The recent proposed amendments to the australian constitution seek to ensure that this 
control is not used to indigenous people’s detriment. However, the proposed amendments 
nevertheless still reinforce the use of racial categories to distinguish people 
(ie‘Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples’(sic)).21 As stated earlier, this is 
problematic because it reproduces, in australia’s foundational legal document, ideas that 
have no basis in reality. And if they are in any sense ‘real’, as a socio-political reality (or 
fantasy), they should not be legitimised and reified in legal documents. The high court of 
australia has already dismissed one fundamental fiction upon which our society had been 
based (terra nullius)22, although the effects of undoing this fiction have not brought 
indigenous people the justice that was sought. Should our greater political and legal 
system also be concerned with ridding itself of this other equally insidious fantasy 
of‘race’? 
 
VI ‘Race’ and epistemological colonisation 
 
 
One effect of constructing aboriginality in the way that it has been defined in the 
australian legal system is that it creates a problematic binary between aboriginal, and its 
silent opposite, non-aboriginal. This binary is predicated on the homogenisation of the 
several hundred distinct First Nations aboriginal peoples on the basis of an imposed race-
based criteria. This racially-based essentialising of a pan-aboriginality serves to maintain 
the colonial logic of subordination and control.  Part of this logic is revealed when one 
interrogates the nature of the binary that is constructed between aboriginal and non-
aboriginal. According to Jacques Derrida, all binaries exist within a ‘violent hierarchy’ 
where one party to the binary holds a dominant position in relation to the other party.23 In 
the Aboriginal/non-Aboriginal binary, the non-Aboriginal party retains the dominant 
position. As such,much that is associated with Aboriginal people retains a subordinate 
positioning, particularly those elements that are not assimilated and exploited by the non-
Aboriginal party. This subordinate position entails a negative positioning of Aboriginal 
lives, peoples and ontologies; a differentiation from the more valued non-Aboriginal 
norm and an exclusion from being able to influence this norm. 
 
Another problematic aspect of the binary between non-Aboriginal and Aboriginal 
is revealed in the ways that it is resisted by aboriginal peoples. One such way that 
aboriginal people have resisted this essentialised (pan)aboriginal/non-aboriginal binary 
has been through the self identification with one’s language group. Therefore people will 
say things like ‘... is descended from the Gagadju people ...’, ‘... a Larrakia man ...’ and 
‘... comes from the Arrernte people ...’. If one looks at Black Politics24 for example, one 
can see that the overwhelming majority of the biographiesof the thirty indigenous 
interviewees who contributed greatly to the content of the book make reference to the 
original nation with whom these people are associated. I would fall short of suggesting 
that this type of self-identification is a conscious means by which people resist race-ist) 
pan-aboriginal essentialism. However, it is nevertheless an assertion of an aboriginal-
centred way of identifying one’s self which seeks to counter colonial categories of self 
which homogenise the several hundred different australian aboriginal groups into one 
mega-group. In doing so, it has the potential effect of resisting one of the fundamental 
elements of the colonial category of ‘Aboriginal’ (sic),: the very idea that there is a 
biologically essential component to aboriginality.. 
 
I will talk more about the detail of this soon, and about how this resistance to racially-
based identity criteria is enacted. What I would seek to emphasise now is that despite 
these kinds of acts of resistance, aboriginal people are continually bound by 
overwhelmingly dominant colonial frameworks that emphasise racially-oriented thinking.  
One glaring example of this is with the indigenous group who, one may say, represents 
one of the most publicly organised and colonially opposed positions in the continent: the 
national congress of australia’s first peoples (‘ncafp’).25 The ncafp take a strong stance in 
pursuing a position based upon the continuing sovereignty of indigenous australians.26 
This stance is reflective of a position which holds that indigenous people did not cede 
their sovereignty over the various parts of the australian continent, nor was this 
sovereignty extinguished by the coloniser’s arrival and entrenchment. This is a strong 
statement of colonial resistance - a strong political statement of colonial resistance. 
However, there is a sense in which the level of epistemological resistance27has not 
matched the political resistance of the ncafp. If one looks at the criteria for membership 
of the congress, one can see that the colonially-imposed, pan-aboriginal and racially-
centred definition of aboriginality is reinforced by the ncafp. In order to be a member of 
the congress one must: 
1. be of aboriginal/torres strait islander descent,  
2. self identify as aboriginal/torres strait islander, and  
3. be accepted as an aboriginal/torres strait islander by an aboriginal/torres strait 
islander community.28 
 
Despite its resistance to the power of the coloniser in its assertion of continuing 
sovereign rights, the congress demonstrates just how overwhelming that colonisation is, 
how ingrained that colonisation is, and how much the coloniser’s epistemologies have 
become a part of us. This is so much so that we ironically now see our very own 
decolonisation within frameworks of understanding that reinforce colonial discourses. In 
adhering to such definitions the obvious question to ask then becomes ‘to what extent 
will our own efforts at achieving “advancement” end up replicating the very 
epistemologies, cultural practises and institutions of the coloniser?’ I’m not suggesting 
here, as Pearson warns us, that to be aboriginal, to resist colonisation, we must adopt the 
exact antithesis of colonial practices and knowledge.29 Rather, what I am suggesting is 
that we be fully aware of where they have originated, how they function, and their 
impacts on our thoughts and actions. And where they are seen to limit thought and action, 
then they should become the subject for close analysis in order to ensure that they do not 
constrain our efforts.  
 
VII Resisting ‘race’, resisting colonisation 
 
I want to now go back to a point that I earlier deferred. I stated previously that aboriginal 
peoples’ identification of themselves in accordance with their original nation (and not as 
‘an aboriginal’) provides the possibility of a resistance to the race-based identity 
categories of the coloniser. How is this so? In essence, ‘race’ is not an aboriginal concept. 
Race is a concept that was brought to this continent by the colonisers. Race is as foreign 
in this continent as the feral animals that the colonisers brought here, and it has caused as 
much, if not more, destruction here as they have. In Yanyuwa, there is no word that 
equates to race. Nevertheless race has now become a concept for aboriginal people andof 
aboriginal people. Aboriginal people have been raced and made racial. Aboriginal people 
have been forced to perform race and been forced to think race. However, aboriginal 
practices that resist the (pan)aboriginal/non-aboriginal binary – aboriginal ways of 
relating to people that do not neatly play these racial categories – may shed light on how 
to eradicate this feral colonial legacy from our legal and social landscape.  
 
Yanyuwa practices of customary adoption30 are an example of this non-adherence 
to racialised thinking, and in their very operation they point to different criteria for 
inclusion into Yanyuwa-neity; a different criteria for who is a part of ‘our mob’.31 In 
Yanyuwa customary adoption practices there are two markers of an outsider’s inclusion 
within Yanyuwa society: one comes in the form of a name that situates a person within a 
social context, the other comes in the form of a name that further situates a person within 
the landscape. The former name is a kinship name that determines how a person is to 
relate to every other person in the Yanyuwa social world (and aboriginal worlds beyond 
Yanyuwa country). The kinship name, or nda-ngalki32, will usually be one of the sixteen 
subsection names or its equivalent, locating a person  at a certain ‘generational level’ 
within one of the four semi-moieties.33 When one has moved from being an outsider to 
then having one of these names, one is then given a position (a relational term) in 
Yanuywa society that influences how they are to appropriately relate to all others in the 
Yanyuwa social environment.  
 
When one has performed one’s social role properly, one may then be given another name 
which will determine how a person will relate to the totality of Yanyuwa country (the 
physical and spiritual environment). This name is referred to as nda-wunyingu34, or one’s 
‘bush name’, and relates one (in substance) to the land, including things on the land and 
things in the land (including original ancestors). The conferral of this name may be said 
to be a more ‘deep’ inclusion into Yanyuwa society.  
 
It is quite common for people who have spent a small amount of time in a country like 
Yanyuwa country, where traditional kinship systems are still highly influential on 
everyday social interactions, to be given a kinship name. There is often a feeling of deep 
gratitude, and of humility, in response to this hospitable gesture to accept them into their 
family. However, such a gesture of hospitality is akin to an invitation to ‘come inside’; to 
come inside the Yanyuwa world. It is akin to an invitation to ‘make yourself at home’, 
but as a guest. However, when one is given a bush name it is more akin to saying ‘here 
are a set of keys to the house, it’s ours together’. In this way, the once outsider is given 
the rights and responsibilities associated with being a host. When one then performs both 
one’s social and environmental roles appropriately, one may be said to be fully Yanyuwa, 
or‘proper Yanyuwa’. This is literally what Yanyuwa Elders say when a once-outsider 
has, for example, participated in initiation ceremonies where, as a necessary pre-requisite, 
and in the very activities of the ceremony, one has performed both their social and 
environmental roles properly (on Yanyuwa terms). At this point the customary adoption 
may be said to be morecomplete.  
 
A major point of significance in this process of customary adoption is that it 
applies to aboriginal people and non-aboriginal people alike.35In applying to both,  it 
reveals the fact that criteria other than race, or other inherent em-bodied ‘substances’, are 
in operation in determining one’s Yanyuwa-neity. In a broad sense, this criteria relates to 
the dual relational realms that are considered important for Yanyuwa people: appropriate 
relationships amongst people and appropriate relationships with the greater environment. 
The criteria underlying these relationships are echoed in Bird-Rose’s ethical principles of 
decolonisation: relationality, mutuality, connectivity, and an engaged responsiveness in 
the present.36 This is by no means the exhaustive list of criteria for inclusion into 
Yanyuwa-neity, but, importantly, they point very strongly away from racial criteria and 
more towards ontological matters as founding one’s inclusion as one of ‘our mob’; as 
Yanyuwa. They point to the pre-eminence of not ‘indigenous knowledge’, but Yanyuwa 
knowledge‘, and by extrapolation, Meriam knowledge, Pitjantjatjara knowledge, 
Tanganekald knowledge, Guugu Yimithirr knowledge, etc. This affirms the pre-eminence 
of the colonially-uninfected epistemologies and ontologies of the different First Nations 
peoples of the place called australia in determining who is in and who is out or who is 
one of our mob and who is not.37 This emphasis points to the preminence of the canon of 
thought of these many different peoples that had existed and developed over tens of 
thousands of years and were contained in the song cycles and associated stories.38 The 
fundamental ‘philosophical’ principles of this true Australian canon, for lack of a better 
word, remain sadly relatively uninterrogated for their value in producing valued 
knowledge in the academy and beyond, and continue to be cast as the lesser stuff of 
mythology, culture and exotic spirituality. A real reconciliation in australia also involves 
engaging with this canon because the “country” (the totality of being/s in this place) has 
also suffered the effects of colonial violence.  
 
VIII Post-race … proceed with care 
 
One of the challenges in pursuing a cautious post-race agenda for the disentanglement of 
our lives from problematic fantasies of race is how to draw upon the lessons of Yanyuwa-
like knowledges and ways of being so as to apply them outside of Yanyuwa country. In 
other words, how can a greater decolonising project be effected on the basis of 
deconstructing essentialised categories of race and reconstructing different (‘more real’) 
bases of group formation? How can ‘our mob’ be defined on our terms, to achieve our 
ends and not reproduce and reinforce deep-rooted and destructive colonial frameworks? 
As aboriginal people only make up roughly 2.5% of the Australian population, if we 
confine the striving and realisation of lesser-colonially-effected aboriginal aspirations to 
only people from certain descent lines, then the chances of their ever influencing 
dominant norms are greatly decreased. So should we ask ourselves, ‘what is 
fundamentally more important, the biological descendants of the continent’s first 
inhabitants (and their empowerment, colonially-influenced or otherwise), or those 
peoples’ ways of being in the world?’ If we lean too much towards the former then we 
will be seduced by race fantasies and have our lives controlled by neo-colonial interests 
that are served by defining us in those artificially colonial terms. If we lean towards the 
latter then the emphasis shifts from who we are to how we are in relation to each other 
and the world around us. and the possibility for having more people work together for the 
realisation of common values is enhanced and therefore the influence on the dominant 
norm is potentially greater The strength of this approach is that it is based upon enduring 
principles that have sustained human life on this continent for thousands of years (the 
“true Australian canon”) and also the very practical reality of allowing for greater 
numbers of people to be a part of this ‘mob’.39 This is not to suggest that ‘non-aboriginal’ 
people can be ‘aboriginal’. Nor is it to suggest that ‘non-aboriginal’ people can be ‘allies’ 
of aboriginal people. Let us get rid of this racially-entrapped word altogether – or at least 
let us get rid of its colonial racial criteria. Let us not reinforce its homogenising effect 
with the use of capital ‘A’ in ‘Aboriginal’ (sic), which cements the colonial racial intent 
by giving this newly-created homogenised group the status of a proper noun of the type 
that we use to refer to nations of peoples like Germans, English or Russians. There is no 
Aboriginal nation. If there is anything nation-like about aboriginal peoples’ jurisdictions 
then it is concerned with the Turrbul nation, the Jagera nation, the Yorta Yorta nation, the 
Larrakia nation etc. Words like ‘Aboriginal’ (sic) only help to keep like-minded and like-
being people apart, preventing them from combining their efforts and increasing their 
power to achieve mutually agreeable ends.  
In pursuing such decolonial ends, we must be cognisant of the need to still address 
pressing needs like many of those that come under the banner of ‘indigenous 
disadvantage’. But how can this disadvantage still be addressed without reinforcing and 
reproducing racial fantasies? The paternalistically imposed strategic essentialist40 
approach of special measures can be beneficial in many respects, particularly with 
regards to the administratively expedient way that it can target resources to address 
‘indigenous disadvantage’. However, this approach can all too easily lead to the 
problematic epistemological colonisation outlined above. A creative and continuing 
discussion needs to be had on how we may differently identify this disadvantage in order 
that resources can be targeted at alleviating that disadvantage. John Gardiner-Garden41 
identified similar issues (but from outside of a decolonising endeavour): 
 
'Aboriginal' is effectively being used as a surrogate for something else, a poor proxy for 'people 
with the needs which a piece of legislation is trying to address'. ... Another approach entirely may 
be required. Perhaps these difficulties will be alleviated only when the surrogate/proxy term is 
abandoned and the 'something else' is spelt out. If legislation is intended to benefit people with a 
particular need, why not define the need?  
 
From my de-colonial stance, I would go somewhat further than Gardiner-Garden and 
state that ‘Aboriginal’ is a category of disadvantage that entitles one to the receipt of 
special measures for the alleviation of that very disadvantage itself of being ‘Aboriginal’. 
This is not to say that all aboriginal people are disadvantaged in reality. Like other 
recognised categories of disadvantage (for example unemployment, homelessness and 
being uneducated) where the disadvantage-alleviation measures are aimed at providing 
the negation of those categories (ieemployment, housing and education), ‘Aboriginal’ is 
similarly a category of disadvantage whose  disadvantage-alleviation measures are aimed 
at achieving its negation  (non‐Aboriginal [‘normal’, assimilated, Australian] ... aboriginal 
no more). In an effort to spell out that ‘something else’ to which Gardiner-Garden refers, 
more discussion needs to be had around two broad areas: 
1. The standards of living that are seen as reflective of ‘living well’ in this place 
called Australia. These indicators of wellbeing should not only not be silent to 
aboriginal ontologies that have seen well-functioning communities live 
sustainably in this place for many thousands of years, but they should seek an 
active inclusion of such ways of being in this place, and; 
 
2. The means by which disadvantage (in relation to the above indicators of 
wellbeing) is both characterised and sought to be alleviated. This discussion needs 
to be predicated on the erasure of racial discourse from the law, while also 
ensuring that no further disadvantage be brought to bear on the people who are 
presently racially classified.  
 
The  special  measures  approach  to  dealing  with  aboriginal  peoples  in  australia  is  a 
product of its time, but it is now due for reconsideration. This way of providing ‘benefit’ 
to aboriginal peoples came about  in 1975, after a  long period where explicitly race‐ist 
laws  and  policy  were  the  norm  for  controlling  aboriginal  peoples’  lives.  In  a  virtual 
strategic essentialist sense, the rda put  in place a similar racial discourse, but one that 
was aimed at using  the essentialised  category of  “the Aboriginal  race of Australia”  to 
achieve apparently more humane outcomes than pre‐1975 legislation. But the strategic 
essentialist  approach  envisaged  by  special  measures  legislation  is  an  assimilatory 
colonial regime in which aboriginal peoples no longer enact aboriginal ontologies; where 
being aboriginal becomes a way becoming not‐aboriginal. 
 
IX Conclusion 
 
Ultimately, the phantasm of race continues to influence the operation of australian society 
in fundamental ways via legal fictions that maintain and legitimise people’s race-deluded 
engagement with the world. An analysis of Yanyuwa practices of customary adoption 
serve a dual purpose of both highlighting the powerful effects of the epistemological 
colonisation that creates and maintains this delusion, as well as possible ways forward for 
their decolonisation.  
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